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Abstract
This paper empirically examines the impact of knowledge spillovers
and geographical proximity on inter-firm trust in buyer-supplier rela-
tions. In particular, the eﬀects of incoming knowledge spillovers from
vertically-related firms and firms’ appropriability problems are ana-
lyzed. The results suggest that there is a positive relationship be-
tween incoming knowledge spillovers from business partners and the
level of inter-firm trust. Firms’ appropriability problems, however,
lead to a decrease in inter-firm trust. Firms that cannot protect their
technical knowledge have a greater perception of customer (supplier)
opportunism. Furthermore, estimation results indicate that inter-firm
trust between geographically close partners exceeds inter-firm trust
between distant partners.
JEL classification: D21; D23; L14; L20
Keywords: Trust; Opportunism; Buyer-Supplier Relations; Knowl-
edge Spillovers; Geographical Proximity
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“Trust is the glue that holds everything together, the bond that creates
healthy communities and successful businesses.” Klaus Schwab and Thierry
Malleret (2003)
1 Introduction
At first glance, the optimistic view expressed in the quotation seems to ex-
aggerate the relevance of trust for economic development. However, recent
empirical studies give support to the hypothesis that trust is important. At
the macroeconomic level, Knack and Keefer (1997), La Porta et al. (1997)
and Zak and Knack (2001) have found that an increase in country-level trust
leads to an increase in economic growth. At the microeconomic level, the
existing empirical literature suggests that trust in buyer-supplier relations
fosters firm performance (Zaheer et al. 1998, Sako 2000, Dyer and Chu
2003). In particular, a higher level of trust has a positive impact on just-in-
time delivery and continuous improvement and learning (Sako 2000), and it
may reduce transaction costs of vertically-related firms substantially (Dyer
and Chu 2003).1
A natural question arising from this is what the sources of trust are. It
is argued in the literature that one important determinant of trust is the
exchange of information between individuals (Fisman and Khanna 1999).
Sako (1998) has postulated that inter-firm trust requires multiple channels
of information flows (communication) between firms and the diﬀusion of this
information within firms. This paper investigates empirically the relevance of
knowledge spillovers and geographical proximity for inter-firm trust in buyer-
supplier relations for a sample of aeronautical firms in Germany.
1In these studies supplier-automaker relationships in the US, Japan and Korea are
investigated.
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Thus far, the empirical literature on the relevance of information flows
for inter-firm trust is scarce. Sako and Helper (1998) and Sako (1998) have
investigated the impact of information flows on suppliers’ trust in their cus-
tomers for the automotive industry in the USA, Japan and Europe. Their
results suggest that the provision of information by customers concerning
their final consumers, their financial situation, and the usage of a supplier’s
product in their production process increases a supplier’s trust. Dyer and
Chu (2000), who have investigated the customer trust of US, Japanese, and
Korean automotive suppliers, found that a supplier’s trust in automakers in-
creases if the latter are providing regular technical assistance to the supplier
in order to help the former to improve product quality, to reduce manufac-
turing costs, or to improve inventory management.
In contrast to these empirical studies that focus on the eﬀects of voluntary
knowledge sharing, this study pays special attention to the eﬀects of invol-
untary leakage of knowledge. In particular, it is examined whether a firms’
ability to appropriate the returns from its proprietary innovations influences
a firm’s trust in vertically related firms. Moreover, the eﬀects of incoming
knowledge spillovers from vertically related firms, which may be generated
by voluntary or involuntary knowle ge sharing, are examined.
Furthermore, existing empirical studies on the determinants of inter-firm
trust provide some indirect evidence for the relevance of geographical proxim-
ity for the emergence of trust. Dyer and Chu (2000), for instance, state that
there is more face-to-face communication between suppliers and automakers
in Japan than in U.S. or Korea, which may positively aﬀect trust. They
argue that this may be facilitated by geographical proximity of suppliers
and automakers in Japan.2 Lane and Bachmann (1996) have investigated
supplier relations in Britain and Germany and conclude that geographical
2In their sample the average distance between supplier and automaker plants is the
lowest in Japan and the highest in the United States.
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proximity of firms fosters the creation of inter-firm trust.3 However, these
are qualitative statements, not statistical tests for the relevance of geography.
In this study the relevance of geographical proximity for inter-firm trust
is explored empirically. Since the dataset used in this study contains in-
formation about a firm’s trust in proximate and distant trading partners,
this allows for investigating the relevance of geographical proximity by us-
ing econometric estimation techniques. Panel data estimation techniques are
employed that control for unobserved firm-specific eﬀects that have not been
taken into account in previous studies based on cross-section regressions.
The sample used in this study comprises 179 firms that have in common
an aeronautical aﬃnity: for example firms are from the aerospace industry,
suppliers of aeronautic firms, or R&D cooperation partners. The majority
of these firms are innovative firms that are engaged in R&D and have intro-
duced at least one product innovation in the two years preceding the survey.
This sample of firms is appropriate for an investigation of the relevance of ap-
propriability conditions and incoming spillovers for inter-firm trust because
it is likely that voluntary and involuntary sharing of technical knowledge is
important, especially for innovative firms.
The empirical results of this study suggest that incoming knowledge
spillovers, appropriability problems, and geographic proximity are indeed rel-
evant for inter-firm trust. The inflow of knowledge from trading partners and
the spatial proximity of trading partners have a positive impact on a firm’s
trust in trading partners. In contrast, firms with appropriability problems
exhibit a lower level of inter-firm trust, all other things being equal. Fur-
thermore, estimation results indicate that trust in customers exceeds trust
in suppliers.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In the next section, the eco-
nomic approach to trust is discussed and hypotheses about the determinants
of inter-firm trust are derived. Section 3 contains a detailed description of the
3Their study is based on 44 lengthy semi-structured interviews.
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data and descriptive statistics. The econometric specification and estimation
results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the findings.
2 Conceptual Framework
Sako (1998, p. 26) defines trust “as a mutual expectation that partners will
not exploit the vulnerabilities created by cooperation”.4 Since trust has its
basis in individuals, it is not appropriate to say that organizations trust each
other. It is possible, however, that employees of one firm may share a trust
orientation toward employees of another firm. Such a shared orientation
may diﬀuse within an organization through various forms of communication,
such as word-of-mouth communication (for example lunch conversations).
According to Zaheer et al. (1998, p. 143) “interorganizational trust describes
the extent to which organizational members have a collectively-held trust
orientation toward the partner firm, which is quite diﬀerent from saying that
organizations trust each other”.5 However, what does inter-firm trust exactly
mean?
Recently, James (2002) has argued that one should distinguish between
‘trust as prudence’ and ‘trust as hope’. The former means that Firm A will
trust Firm B if Firm A knows that Firm B has no incentive to exploit Firm
A’s trust. He calls this ‘trust as prudence’ since it is ‘prudent’ for an agent
to trust another agent, if the latter has no incentive to exploit the trust.
However, as pointed out by James (p. 293), this leads to the following trust
paradox: “..., if I know that my partner does not have an incentive to exploit
my trust, does it make sense for me to say that I trust her?” In contrast, ‘trust
as hope’ means that a firm decides to trust another firm hoping that trust
4Of course, not every cooperation between firms necessarily creates vulnerabilities; for
example suﬃciently complete contracts may discipline firms.
5The empirical results reported by Zaheer et al. suggest that interpersonal and interor-
ganizational trust are related but distinct constructs.
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will not be exploited, although the other firm may have an incentive to do
so (James, p. 303). To understand the diﬀerence between trust as prudence
and trust as hope, it is helpful to refer to Craswell’s (1993) distinction of
trust as behavior (explanandum) vs. trust as cause of behavior (explanans).
Trust as behavior is just a simple label assigned to a certain strategy. In
contrast, trust as cause of behavior means that trust determines behavior.
This distinction can be clarified by Figure 1, which reports the pay-oﬀs
of a simple game (Prisoners’ dilemma). A supplier and a customer have to
decide whether or not to trust each other. If the supplier trusts the customer
and the customer also trusts the supplier, both firms receive a amount of
money (a > 0). If the the supplier chooses the ‘Trust’ strategy and the
customer the ‘No Trust’ strategy, the supplier has a negative pay-oﬀ (d >
0) and the customer gets an additional amount of money (c > 0), and vice
versa. If both choose the ‘No Trust’ strategy, their payoﬀs are zero.
Insert Figure 1
Suppose that this game is infinitely repeated. If both firms make use
of standard trigger strategies and the discount factor is suﬃciently high,
they will choose the ‘Trust’ strategy in each period since they are better oﬀ
by choosing this strategy than by choosing the ‘No Trust’ strategy.6 This
behavior can be labeled as trust. In contrast, the Nash equilibrium of the one-
shot version of the game is the ‘No Trust’ strategy. If one firm still chooses
the ‘Trust’ strategy in the one shot version, this behavior may be caused
by the firm’s ‘trust’ in the other firm. Thus ‘trust as prudence’ corresponds
to ‘trust as behavior ’ and ‘trust as hope’ corresponds to ‘trust as cause of
behavior ’.
6For instance, a firm that deviates from choosing the ‘Trust’ strategy can be punished
by the other firm since the latter can then play the static Nash equilibrium (‘No Trust’)
in all following periods.
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Unfortunately, ‘trust as hope’ and ‘trust as prudence’ can hardly be mea-
sured separately in empirical analyses. If firms assess their level of trust in a
customer (supplier) in a questionnaire, a high level of trust is compatible with
both concepts of trust. In both cases, respondents will report a high level of
trust because they expect that their vulnerabilities will not be exploited by
their partners. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the determinants of
inter-firm trust that are investigated empirically in this study do not have
opposed eﬀects on ‘trust as prudence’ and ‘trust as hope’; for example a
determinant should not have a positive (negative) eﬀect on ‘trust as hope’
and simultaneously a negative (positive) eﬀect on ‘trust a prudence’. Oth-
erwise counteracting eﬀects would make it diﬃcult to interpret the results
with respect to the relevance of the determinants of inter-firm trust.
Incoming Knowledge Spillovers: Sako and Helper argue that pro-
prietary knowledge intentionally provided by business partners may create
an atmosphere of trust. To see how the disclosure of knowledge by a busi-
ness partner may be related to inter-firm trust, let us assume that Firm A
and Firm B can benefit their trading relationship by exchanging proprietary
knowledge concerning their products and production processes or harm the
trading partner by behaving opportunistically.
First, it is assumed that unforeseen contingencies exist and that firms de-
ciding on their strategy cannot evaluate all future benefits of their actions.7
Nooteboom (2002, p. 5) states that “The machinery of rational choice breaks
down when we go beyond risk, in the economist’s interpretation as the vari-
ance of a distribution of probabilities attached to alternative outcomes.” If
Firm A still discloses knowledge to Firm B, this action may be based on
the hope that Firm B acts in a trustworthy manner with the knowledge,
that Firm B treats the disclosed knowledge confidentially and does not share
7“An unforseen contingency is a set of circumstances that ex ante the parties to the
transaction had not considered” (Kreps 1990, p. 116).
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it without permission. Here, ‘trust as hope’ causes Firm A’s disclosure of
knowledge. Consequently, the disclosure of knowledge by Firm A may act as
a signal of trust. Furthermore, one might argue that trusting behavior of a
firm is an indication of its own trustworthiness.8 If Firm A’s signal of trust
is indeed perceived by Firm B as a signal of Firm A’s trustworthiness, then
Firm B will reciprocate with trust. In other words, the inflow of knowledge
from Firm A may be associated with an increase in the level of Firm B0s
‘trust as hope’ in Firm A.9 This may lead in turn to a disclosure of knowl-
edge by Firm B to Firm A. Thus, the disclosure of knowledge to the other
firm is caused by ‘trust as hope’ and the inflow of knowledge from the other
firm causes ‘trust as hope’.
Now let us assume a situation similar to the one described in Figure 1
where unforeseen contingencies do not exist and firms can evaluate all future
benefits of their actions: Firm A and B participate in a repeated game using
standard trigger strategies, and the disclosure of knowledge is the equilibrium
of the game. Firm A and Firm B disclose knowledge to each other, because
both firms know that they do not have any incentive to exploit each other’s
vulnerabilities. In this case, both firms receive proprietary knowledge from
the other and exhibit a high level of ‘trust as prudence’ in the other.
Thus, a positive relationship between inflow of knowledge from the part-
ner and trust in the partner is compatible with the concept of ‘trust as hope’
as well as with the concept of ‘trust as prudence’. Moreover, the above dis-
cussion suggests that feedback loops may exist (i.e. the level of trust may be
8Glaeser et al. (2000) and recently Ashraf et al. (2006) report that trustworthiness
(measured by the percentage returned in trust experiments) is positively and significantly
correlated with attitudinal measures of trust (based on attitudinal survey questions). Of
course, this does not necessarily imply that behaviors of trust are good predictors of
trustworthiness. To the author’s best knowledge empirical studies have yet not dealt with
the question of whether behaviors of trust are related to trustworthiness.
9It is ’trust as hope’ because firm B still does not know whether firm A has an incentive
to exploit trust or not.
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aﬀected by incoming knowledge spillovers and trust in the relationship may
aﬀect the inflow of knowledge from a business partner).
In addition to the voluntary provision of information by a trading partner,
an inflow of knowledge may also be the result of a leakage of knowledge not
intended by the partner. It is not obvious whether such involuntary spillovers
have a positive impact on inter-firm trust, but it can at least be expected
that such incoming knowledge spillovers from vertically-related firms do not
have a negative impact, irrespective of whether it is ‘trust as prudence’ or
‘trust as hope’. If transfer of knowledge is of any relevance for inter-firm
trust, a positive relationship between the inflow of knowledge from a trading
partner and the level of trust in the respective business partner is likely.
Hypothesis 1: there is a positive relationship between the inflow of
knowledge from customers (suppliers) and suppliers’ (customers’)
trust in customers (suppliers).
Appropriability conditions: A firm can appropriate the returns of
its innovations if it is able to protect its proprietary knowledge. Appropri-
ability problems may arise, however, if knowledge leaks out inadvertently
to other firms. Potential channels of leakage of knowledge are, for instance,
the informal exchange of technical knowledge between employees from diﬀer-
ent firms, reverse engineering, patent information or movement of employees
from one firm to another (Mansfield 1985, p. 221). If the danger of leakage of
knowledge is not related to the buyer-supplier relationship, a firm’s appropri-
ability problems may not have any impact on trust in customers (suppliers).
In this case, it is perfectly possible for a firm to fear that knowledge spills
over to competitors and for the same firm to trust its customers (suppliers).
The story might be quite diﬀerent, however, if the danger of leakage of
knowledge is related to the buyer-supplier relationship. A firm may fear, for
instance, that its knowledge will leak out to competitors via common sup-
pliers or customers. For instance, Firm A may disclose a process innovation
10
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to Firm B, and the latter may further transfer disclosed knowledge to Firm
A’s competitor. If Firm A cannot protect its process innovation through the
complexity of its production process or through lead time in commercializa-
tion, such a leakage of knowledge may reduce Firm A’s ability to appropriate
the returns of its innovation (see Bönte and Keilbach 2005, Cassiman and
Veugelers 2002). Obviously, imperfect appropriability will have a negative
impact on a firm’s ‘trust as prudence’ in its suppliers and customers if it
creates or increases the business partners’ incentive to exploit trust.
How ‘trust as hope’ is aﬀected by appropriability problems is not that
clear. On the one hand, the level of ‘trust as hope’ is defined as trusting
in situations where the partner has an incentive to exploit vulnerabilities.
This would imply that ‘trust as hope’ is not aﬀected by appropriability prob-
lems. On the other hand, it does not seem to be very likely that a firm will
keep trusting its customers (suppliers), regardless of how severe appropri-
ability problems are. Therefore, it can be expected that, if any, the impact
of appropriability problems on firms’ level of ‘trust as hope’ and ‘trust as
prudence’ in customers (suppliers) is negative.
Hypothesis 2: a firm’s appropriability problems have a negative
impact on the firm’s level of trust in customers (suppliers).
Geographical proximity: It is argued by some scholars that ‘trust
needs touch’ (Gallié and Guichard 2005, Handy 1995). In this respect, geo-
graphical proximity of trading partners may be associated with a higher level
of mutual inter-firm trust in buyer-supplier relationships (Narasimhan and
Nair 2005). If geographical proximity reduces the trading partners’ incen-
tives to behave opportunistically, the level of ‘trust as prudence’ in proximate
business partners will exceed that of distant ones. Firms may find it easier,
for instance, to monitor the actions of geographically proximate trading part-
ners than the actions of distant ones, which would imply that the ability to
ascertain whether trading partners behave opportunistically decreases with
11
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geographical distance. Especially frequent face-to-face contacts, which are
facilitated by geographical proximity, may enable trading partners to learn
about each others’ motives.
Moreover, firms may be embedded in local networks (MacKinnon et al.
2004). If the social and institutional aspects of such networks positively in-
fluence ‘trust as hope’, the level of ‘trust as hope’ will decrease with distance.
Therefore, it can be expected that the potential impact of spatial proximity
is positive for both concepts of trust.
Hypothesis 3: Inter-firm trust between business partners located
in geographical proximity is higher than inter-firm trust between
distant partners.
However, Hypothesis 3 and the other two hypotheses may be interrelated.
It is often argued that the transfer of knowledge is easier between proximate
firms than between distant ones, and therefore firms are interlinked in lo-
cal knowledge networks (Audretsch and Feldman 1996, Lawson and Lorenz
1999). Thus, there exists an ‘indirect eﬀect’ of geographical proximity work-
ing via knowledge flows between proximate business partners. Moreover,
geographic proximity facilitates the movement of employees from one firm to
another (Marshall 1920), and the existence of local labor markets may have
an impact on inter-firm trust. On the one hand, employees moving from cus-
tomers to suppliers and vice versa may contribute to the creation inter-firm
trust. On the other hand, ‘head-hunting’ activities by business partners may
have a negative influence on inter-firm trust.
Thus, there may be a ‘direct’ eﬀect of geographical proximity due to better
monitoring and there may exist ‘indirect’ eﬀects. In the econometric model
that will be discussed in Section 4.1, variables are included that capture the
eﬀects of labor markets and control for such ‘indirect’ eﬀects.
12
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3 Data
3.1 Definition of variables
Trust in customers and suppliers: Existing empirical studies have tried
to identify diﬀerent types of trust, even though they have not diﬀerenti-
ated between ‘trust as prudence’ and ‘trust as hope’. Sako (2000, 1998), for
instance, distinguishes between contractual trust and goodwill trust. The
former refers to promise keeping irrespective of whether the promises are
written or oral, and the latter goes beyond contractual trust, referring to the
expectation that the other party is willing to take initiatives over and above
what was promised.10 According to Sako (2000, p. 89), a precondition of
goodwill trust is a consensus on the principle of fairness (i.e. the absence
of opportunistic behavior). Sako and Helper have used diﬀerent scale items
to measure diﬀerent types of trust and opportunism separately.11 Similarly,
Dyer and Chu (2000) used a trust measure based on the sum of three scale
items reflecting fairness and reliability.
In this study, I chose a diﬀerent approach. First, the dataset on which the
empirical analysis is based does not contain diﬀerent scale items measuring
diﬀerent types of trust. However, the questionnaire gives an explanation of
what is meant by ‘trust’ before asking the question concerning trust. Re-
spondents were provided with the following information about trust: “An
atmosphere of trust between business and cooperation partners means, for
example, that partners (a) treat the information and the knowledge they
share confidentially, (b) do not have to fear to be cheated, (c) do cooper-
ate without detailed legally binding contracts, (d) can rely on each other to
make their best eﬀort.” This distinction can reflect both ‘trust as hope’ and
10See Sako (1998, p. 27).
11They found, however, that survey respondents in the USA did not diﬀerentiate between
diﬀerent types of trust and opportunism whereas such diﬀerences were found for Japanese
respondents.
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‘trust as prudence’. The question used to assess the level of trust in trading
partners is “To what degree do you trust your most important business and
cooperation partners?”12
Second, the dataset contains information about levels of trust in spatially
proximate and distant trading partners. Respondents could indicate the
degree of trust in proximate (distant) customers and proximate (distant)
suppliers on a scale from 1 (very low degree of trust) to 6 (very high degree
of trust).13 Consequently, four diﬀerent trust measures are used in this study:
(1) trust in proximate customers, (2) trust in distant customers, (3) trust in
proximate suppliers, (4) trust in distant suppliers. In contrast, Sako and
Helper (1998) and Dyer and Chu (2000) exclusively dealt with a supplier’s
trust in its customers without taking geographical distance into account.
It is assumed here that the trust measures are indicators for the degree
of inter-firm trust. This is the case if the general managers who have been
interviewed have suﬃcient knowledge about the trust orientation collectively
held by most of the employees towards proximate and distant customers
and suppliers. Moreover, the trust measures used in this study may reflect
goodwill trust and elements of fairness, such as the absence of opportunism.
Incoming knowledge spillovers: Since quality and quantity of knowl-
edge flows are not observable; an observable indicator that may represent
the former is used instead. In the questionnaire, firms were asked for their
access to external technical knowledge. Before asking the question, it was
12Firms that do not have important customers/suppliers in geographic proxim-
ity/distance could mark the answer “not existent”. The questions are focused on the
“most important business partners” in order to reduce ambiguity. In a similar way Sako
(2000) has asked automotive suppliers for their most important customer.
13A very high score indicates that the actual relationship with the trading partner is
described adequately by the four aspects (a to d) given in the explanation of inter-firm
trust, while a very low score suggests that none of the aspects apply. A medium score may
point to the case where some aspects apply and others do not.
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explained what was meant by ‘access to external technical knowledge’: “In
order to realize product and process innovations firms may have access to
external knowledge of other firms and institutions. This access may be the
result of informal exchange of technical knowledge, joint development teams,
R&D contracts, research joint ventures and so on.” The corresponding ques-
tion asked, “How important have been customers (suppliers) in the years from
1997 to 2000 as external sources of knowledge for your innovation activities?
Please assess the importance on a scale ranging from 1 ( unimportant) to 6
(very important).” I use the score of this question as a measure of incoming
knowledge spillovers.
Imperfect appropriability: Imperfect appropriability was measured by
the following question: “How relevant is the danger that technical knowledge
generated in your company may ‘leak out’ to other companies? [Please rate
the danger ranging from 1 (no danger) to 6 (great danger)].” The score
of this question is my measure of imperfect appropriability. The question
does not diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent types of firms (e.g. competitors,
customers and suppliers) that may benefit from leakage of knowledge. It does,
however, distinguish between proximate and distant firms. Furthermore, it
is important that firms assess the danger of leakage of knowledge, as this
measure tends to reflect involuntary spillovers that inhibit the firm’s ability
to appropriate rents from innovations.
Labor sources: Firms were provided with the following information:
“Companies need a qualified workforce. Employees may be recruited from
universities, colleges or other companies.” I measured the relevance of cus-
tomers (suppliers) as labor sources by the score of the following ques-
tion.“How important have the following firms and institutions been for your
firm’s recruiting activities between 1997 and 2000? [Please rate the impor-
tance ranging from 1 (irrelevant) to 6 (highly important)].”
15
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Head-hunting: The danger of head-hunting was measured by the scores of
the following question: “How relevant is the danger that your employees are
head-hunted by other firms? [Please rate the danger ranging from 1 (no dan-
ger) to 6 (great danger)]” Analogous to the measurement of spillovers, this
question does not diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent types of firms (e.g. competi-
tors, customers and suppliers). Analogous to the imperfect appropriability
measure, this indicator reflects problems of head-hunting due to head-hunting
activities of proximate (distant) firms.
Geographical proximity: Theoretical considerations uggest that geo-
graphical distance between firms may have an influence on the level of trust
as well as on inter-firm knowledge flows. In order to account for the rele-
vance of geography, each of the questions distinguishes between inter-firm
linkages to proximate and distant firms. Clear-cut measures of geographical
proximity, such as a 50 miles radius, are not used. Instead, the questionnaire
allowed the interviewed managers to decide which other firms and institu-
tions are nearby and which ones are distant. In the questionnaire, the firms
were provided with diﬀerent information about the concept of geographic
proximity used in this study. First, the notion of geographic proximity was
defined by a maximum radius of two hours driving time. Second, it was ex-
plained that geographic proximity allows for regular ‘face-to-face’ contacts.
Third, firms were provided with two illustrations in the questionnaire that
gave an example of geogra hic proximity.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
In this study, I use four firm-specific trust measures: trust in proxi-
mate/distant customers and trust in proximate/distant suppliers. Therefore,
the sample is analyzed along two corresponding dimensions: customers vs.
suppliers and proximate vs. distant firms. However, several managers have
marked the answer ‘not existent’ and consequently, these observations can-
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not be used for the further analysis. In addition, several observations had
to be dropped due to missing values in the explanatory variables so that we
are left with 176 firms and a total number of 637 observations.14 Descriptive
statistics for this sample are presented in Table 1.
As can be seen from the upper part of the Table 1, the measured level of
trust in vertically-related firms is high, ranging from 4.02 to 4.58. Trust in
customers in geographical proximity appears to be higher than trust in other
vertically-related firms. In order to check whether these diﬀerences are statis-
tically significant, I performed statistical tests. Diﬀerences between the mean
values of proximate and distant firms are not very large in absolute terms,
and the test results indicate that the null hypothesis that they are equal
cannot be rejected. In contrast, diﬀerences between firms’ trust in suppliers
and customers exist. The mean values of measured trust in customers are
significantly higher than the measured trust in suppliers irrespective where
firms are located. Thus, descriptive statistics provide only weak empirical ev-
idence for the hypothesis that geography matters for the emergence of trust.
A remarkable diﬀerence, however, is found between trust in customers and
suppliers.
Similar results are obtained for incoming spillovers. Customers in prox-
imity appear to be more relevant as external knowledge sources than distant
customers and suppliers. While diﬀerences between proximate and distant
firms are statistically insignificant, the diﬀerences between customers and
suppliers are statistically significant. A somewhat diﬀerent picture emerges
for the relevance of customers and suppliers as labor sources. Here, sta-
tistically significant diﬀerences between proximate and distant firms exist,
whereas results do not indicate that the relevance of customers and suppliers
diﬀers. With respect to the measure of imperfect appropriability and the
head-hunting measure, I can only test for diﬀerences between proximate and
14The highest possible number of observations is 716, four observations for each of the
179 firms.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Trust proximity distance diﬀerence
customers 4.58 4.38
0.20
(1.57)
suppliers 4.10 4.02
0.08
(0.57)
diﬀerence
0.48∗∗
(3.79)
0.36∗∗
(2.60)
Knowledge source proximity distance diﬀerence
customers 3.42 3.39
0.03
(0.13)
suppliers 2.43 2.80
−0.37
(−1, 66)
diﬀerence
0.99∗∗
(4.33)
0.59∗∗
(2.65)
Labor source proximity distance diﬀerence
customers 1.90 1.48
0.42∗∗
(2.93)
suppliers 1.95 1.59
0.36∗
(2.25)
diﬀerence
−0.05
(−0.28)
−0.11
(−0.96)
proximity distance diﬀerence
Imperf. appropriability 2.67 2.63
0.04
(0.84)
Head-hunting 2.77 2.26
0.52
(2.82∗∗)
Note: Two-sided t-test on diﬀerences in two means of dependent (paired) samples. The
null hypothesis is that the mean of diﬀerences is zero. The asterisks * and ** denote
significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 2: Correlations between explanatory variables
Customers (inc.) spillovers imp. approp. labor head-hunting
(inc.) spillovers 1
imp. approp. 0.29 1
labor 0.18 0.08 1
head-hunting 0.27 0.36 0.29 1
Suppliers (inc.) spillovers imp. approp. labor head-hunting
(inc.) spillovers 1
imp. approp. 0.28 1
labor 0.10 0.18 1
head-hunting 0.11 0.34 0.28 1
distant firms since these measures reflect problems of appropriability and
head-hunting. Test results suggest that, on average, head-hunting by prox-
imate firms is viewed as a greater problem than headhunting activities of
distant firms. Such a diﬀerence does not exist for the measure of imperfect
appropriability.
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for independent variables sepa-
rately for customers and suppliers. The strongest correlation can be found
between the measure of imperfect appropriability and the head-hunting mea-
sure, which may indicate that movement of employees due to other firms’
head-hunting activities is one relevant channel for the leakage of knowledge.
However, even between these measures the pairwaise correlation is low (0.34,
0.36), which suggests that there is no severe multicollinearity problem.
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Econometric Specification
One way to analyze the data is to compute separate regressions for each trust
category. In this case, the estimation equations for each trust category can
be specified as follows:
Trusticp = α1 + β11 spillicp + β12 laboricp + β13 iappropip (1a)
+β14 headip + ε1i,
T rusticd = α2 + β21 spillicd + β22 laboricd + β23 iappropid (1b)
+β24 headid + ε2i,
Trustisp = α3 + β31 spillisp + β32 laborisp + β33 iappropip (1c)
+β34 headip + ε3i,
Trustisd = α4 + β41 spillisd + β42 laborisd + β43 iappropid (1d)
+β44 headid + ε4i,
where ε1i to ε4i, are error terms, i (= 1, .., N) denotes the firm index, cp (cd)
are customers in proximity (distance), sp (sd) are suppliers in proximity (dis-
tance), and Trust is the trust measure of each trust category. The variables
spill and labor represent the respective measures of the relevance of vertically
related firms as knowledge and labor sources. Recall that the iapprop and
the head variables, which reflect the danger of leakage of knowledge and the
danger of head-hunting, are identical for customer and supplier trust cate-
gory, but vary with distance (p, d). The β parameters reflect the marginal
impact of the explanatory variables on trust levels for firms in each category.
Estimating each of the equations separately allows for exploitation of the
cross section variation, but not the ‘within’ firm variation between the trust
categories. In order to exploit both the variation ‘within’ firms as well as the
variation ‘between’ firms, the estimation equation can be specified as follows:
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Trustit = α+ β1 spillit + β2 laborit + β3 iappropig + β4 headig (2)
+γ prox+ uit,
i = 1, .., N ; t = cp, cd, sp, sd; g = p, d.
where the variables Trust, spill and labor have a double subscript, with
i denoting the firms and t denoting customers in proximity (distance) and
suppliers in proximity (distance). Since the measures of imperfect appro-
priability (iapprop) and the head-hunting measure (head) do not vary with
customer and supplier, they are indexed by g and not by t. Furthermore, a
proximity-dummy (prox) is included into the regression that takes the value
one if the trust measure belongs to the proximity category and zero oth-
erwise. This dummy variable captures all eﬀects of geographical proximity
common to all firms that are not controlled for by the ‘indirect eﬀects’ of the
explanatory variables, and I interpret the parameter γ as the ‘direct’ eﬀect
of geographical proximity on trust levels.
This econometric specification allows me to take into account unobserved
heterogeneity of firms. The disturbance term of the one-way error component
model that is used in most panel data applications is specified as follows
(Baltagi 1995, p. 9):
uit = μi + vit, i = 1, .., N ; t = cp, cd, sp, sd, (3)
where μi denotes the unobservable firm-specific eﬀect and vit (∼ IID(0, σ2))
is the remainder disturbance. The former controls for firm-specific eﬀects that
are not included in the regression, such as omitted variables and misspecifica-
tions. The firm-specific eﬀect may reflect, for instance, the collectively-held
trust orientation by employees of a firm i towards partner firms in general.
Two diﬀerent assumptions about μi are usually made: firm-specific eﬀects
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are assumed to be fixed parameters, or it is assumed that μi is randomly dis-
tributed across firms with μi ∼ IID(0, σ2).15 It is often argued that the fixed
eﬀects model is a reasonable approach, if one focuses on a specific sample of
N firms, while the random eﬀects model is appropriate if one is drawing N
firms randomly from a large population (Baltagi 1995, Greene 2003).
The properties of firm-specific eﬀects, however, are relevant for the es-
timation of this model. If firm-specific eﬀects do not exist (μi = 0), the
simple OLS estimator provides consistent and eﬃcient estimates of the β
parameters. If fixed eﬀects exist, simple OLS estimates are biased since the
explanatory variables are correlated with uit, whereas the fixed eﬀects esti-
mator provides unbiased results. If they are randomly distributed, simple
OLS as well as fixed eﬀects estimator provide consistent estimates, but these
are not eﬃcient. In this case, a GLS estimator is appropriate. Therefore, I
will provide specification tests for the diﬀerent models in order to identify
the appropriate model.
Two objections can be raised against the econometric specification of the
estimation equation (2). First, it may be criticized that a linear specification
of the relationship between trust and the explanatory variables does not
take into account the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. Second,
it can be argued that it is not appropriate to assume that the parameters
of the four trust equations are identical. Results of an empirical analysis
reported in appendix B show that the linear specification is a reasonable
approximation.16 Moreover, results suggest that diﬀerences between trust in
customers and suppliers may exist. Therefore, a dummy-variable that takes
the value 1 when trust is measured by trust in customers and zero otherwise
is included into the estimation equation (2). This dummy variable captures
the diﬀerences between trust in customers and trust in suppliers that are not
15The explanatory variables are assumed to be independent of μi and vit.
16Appendices are available on the JEBO website. The robustness of estimation results
with respect to the choice of estimation method has also been reported by Dyer and Chu
(2000) and Sako and Helper (1998).
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controlled for by the explanatory variables. Moreover, estimation results of
separate regression for customers and suppliers will be presented.
4.2 Estimation Results
The estimation results of simple OLS, fixed eﬀects and random eﬀects esti-
mations are reported for an unbalanced and a balanced panel in Tables 3 and
4. The unbalanced panel consists of 176 firms and 637 observations. The
balanced panel consists of 133 firms with four observations per firm and thus
a total number of 532 observations. The R2 of each regression is relatively
low (≤ .07), with the exception of the fixed eﬀects estimation (.65; .67). The
high explanatory power of the fixed eﬀects estimation implies that trust lev-
els are mainly ‘explained’ by unobservable firm-specific fixed eﬀects. The
results of Hausman specification tests, however, do not reject the null hy-
pothesis that firm-specific eﬀects are random. The estimated coeﬃcient of
the customer-dummy variable is positive and statistically significant in all re-
gressions. This indicates that firms’ trust in customers exceeds their trust in
suppliers, which is in line with the descriptive statistics presented in Section
3.2.
The estimated coeﬃcient of the incoming spillover variable is positive and
statistically significant in the simple OLS, the fixed, and the random eﬀects
estimation for the unbalanced and the balanced panel. Thus, Hypothesis 1
has to be accepted. As predicted by Hypothesis 2, the estimated coeﬃcient
of the imperfect appropriability variable is negative throughout the regres-
sions. It is statistically significant in simple OLS and random eﬀects while
statistically insignificant in the fixed eﬀects regression. In addition, I per-
formed a ‘between’ estimation, which is simply a regression of the average
trust level of each firm on the average values of the explanatory variables.
This cross-section estimation provides a positive but statistically insignificant
estimate of the coeﬃcient of the incoming spillover variable and negative and
statistically significant coeﬃcient of the imperfect appropriability variable.
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ptTable 3: Determinants of Trust in Customers and Suppliers (unbalancedpanel)
Simple OLS Fixed Random Between
(Incoming) spillovers
0.073∗∗
(2.86)
0.098∗∗
(3.57)
0.085∗∗
(3.52)
0.049
(0.97)
Imperf. appropriability
−0.119∗∗
(−3.31)
−0.042
(−0.82)
−0.082∗
(−2.12)
−0.107
(−1.74)
Labor source
−0.017
(−0.43)
0.029
(0.68)
0.009
(0.25)
−0.077
(−0.91)
Head-hunting
0.029
(0.87)
0.007
(0.17)
0.021
(0.62)
0.045
(0.68)
Proximity dummy
0.159
(1.54)
0.197∗∗
(2.42)
0.179∗∗
(2.32)
–
Customer dummy
0.375∗∗
(3.83)
0.311∗∗
(4.33)
0.332∗∗
(4.72)
–
Constant
4.033∗∗
(29.61)
–
3.899∗∗
(26.95)
4.429∗∗
(18.32)
R2 0.06 0.67 0.05 0.02
Standard Error 1.2096 0.8394 1.2122 1.0117
F-test: Total vs. FE – 4.87∗∗ – –
χ2-test: RE vs. FE – – 9.49 –
Observations 637 637 637 176
Notes: The t-values are reported in parentheses. The asterisks * and ** denote significant
at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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ptTable 4: Determinants of Trust in Customers and Suppliers (balanced panel)
Simple OLS Fixed Random Between
(Incoming) spillovers
0.079∗∗
(2.71)
0.100∗∗
(3.37)
0.091∗∗
(3.43)
0.067
(1.13)
Imperf. appropriability
−0.126∗∗
(−3.31)
−0.029
(−0.51)
−0.087∗
(−2.06)
−0.144∗
(−2.23)
Labor source
0.0020
(0.05)
0.015
(0.33)
0.011
(0.27)
−0.012
(−0.12)
Head-hunting
0.008
(0.21)
−0.010
(−0.21)
0.0016
(0.04)
0.012
(0.16)
Proximity dummy
0.274∗
(2.49)
0.273∗∗
(3.10)
0.272∗∗
(3.23)
–
Customer dummy
0.325∗∗
(3.12)
0.310∗∗
(4.15)
0.317∗∗
(4.28)
–
Constant
3.984∗∗
(27.35)
–
3.847∗∗
(24.34)
4.383∗∗
(16.36)
R2 0.07 0.65 0.06 0.04
Standard Error 1.1590 0.8222 1.1611 0.9234
F-test: Total vs. FE – 4.93∗∗ – –
χ2-test: RE vs. FE – – 2.73 –
Observations 532 532 532 133
Notes: The t-values are reported in parentheses. The asterisks * and ** denote significant
at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Diﬀerences between the fixed eﬀects and the between estimation results
with respect to the significance level of the spillover variable and the imper-
fect appropriability variable may be intuitively explained by the fact that
the former estimator wipes out the firm-specific eﬀects and thus ignores the
cross-section variation in the panel, whereas the latter ignores the ‘within’
variation of the variables. Therefore, the results of the fixed eﬀects regres-
sions suggest that the variation in the four trust scores ‘within’ each firm can
be explained by the variation in the relevance of incoming spillovers from
diﬀerent trading partners ‘within’ each firm, but not by the variation in the
appropriability conditions. The latter finding may be due to the fact that
the measure of imperfect appropriability varies with distance, but not with
the type of trading partner. Therefore, it can explain the variation in trust
in proximate and distant firms, but not diﬀerences between customer and
supplier trust. The between estimation, which emphasizes the cross-section
variation, suggests that diﬀerences between the firms’ average trust-levels
are, at least to some extent, due to diﬀerences in the firms’ appropriability
conditions. The estimation results for the random eﬀects and the simple
OLS estimator, which reflect the ‘within’ as well as the ‘between’ variation,
indicate that both variables have an impact on trust levels.17
Furthermore, the estimation results provide empirical evidence in sup-
port of Hypothesis 3. The estimated coeﬃcient of the proximity dummy
variable is positive and statistically significant for the balanced panel, and
the same result is obtained for the unbalanced panel, controlling for unob-
served heterogeneity by using fixed and random eﬀects estimators. Thus,
results indicate that geographical proximity matters for the emergence of
trust in buyer-supplier relations.
The estimated coeﬃcient of the labor source variable as well as the esti-
17The random eﬀects estimator (GLS) is a matrix weighted average of the fixed eﬀects
and the between estimator while the simple OLS estimator gives equal weight to the
variation within and between firms. See Baltagi (p. 16).
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mated coeﬃcient of the head-hunting variable are statistically insignificant
throughout all regressions. Thus, the relevance of customers (suppliers) for a
firm’s recruiting activities and the danger of head hunting activities by other
firms do not influence the level of trust in customers and suppliers.
4.3 Robustness Checks
In this section I present estimates based on alternative specifications intended
to scrutinize the robustness of the results in Table 4. Columns (2) to (5) in
Table 5 present the results of robustness checks, and column (1) reproduces
the result of the random eﬀects estimation in Table 4.
First, one might question whether the panel regressions presented thus
far adequately control for a correlation of error terms due to potential inter-
relation of a firm’s trust measures. To take such a correlation into account,
Equations (1a), (1b), (1c) and (1d) have been estimated by a Seemingly
Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) procedure. The estimation results
for the balanced panel are reported in Column (2) of Table 5. The residuals
of the estimation equations are indeed correlated, but controlling for this
correlation hardly aﬀects the results. As before, incoming knowledge and
appropriability problems have a statistically significant impact on trust.18
Furthermore, one might suspect that some of the results of the panel
regression can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that firms in the
sample are operating in various industries; the result that trust in customers
is higher than trust in suppliers. The majority of firms are suppliers of
technologically critical ‘flying material’, such as suppliers of cabin interior
components and systems (e.g. aircraft interior plastic products, safety belts,
kitchen, vacuum toilets and so on), suppliers of electrical parts (e.g. mea-
18Although not reported the constant terms are allowed to vary between equations, and
their diﬀerence is statistically significant. Their estimated values also confirm the previous
results; diﬀerences between constant terms suggest that trust in proximate firms and trust
in customers are higher.
27
Page 27 of 46 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
ptTable 5: Determinants of Trust in Customers and Suppliers: Alternative
Specifications (balanced panel)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Random SUR Random G2SLSb) G2SLSb)
(Inc.) spillovers
0.091∗∗
(3.43)
0.114∗∗
(4.49)
0.089∗∗
(3.35)
0.164∗
(2.07)
0.155
(1.80)
Imperf. approp.
−0.087∗
(−2.06)
−0.104∗∗
(−2.47)
−0.08∗
(−1.99)
−0.102∗
(−2.24)
−0.099∗
(−2.06)
Labor source
0.011
(0.27)
0.039
(1.06)
0.05
(0.14)
−0.000
(−0.01)
−0.001
(−0.32)
Head-hunting
0.002
(0.04)
−0.168
(−0.45)
−0.002
(−0.05)
−0.011
(−0.28)
−0.012
(−0.75)
Prox. dummy
0.272∗∗
(3.23)
a)
0.277∗∗
(3.29)
0.310∗∗
(3.32)
0.311∗∗
(3.29)
Cust. dummy
0.317∗∗
(4.28)
a)
0.318∗∗
(4.30)
0.262∗∗
(2.81)
0.269∗∗
(2.79)
Industry eﬀects No No Yes No Yes
NOTES: The t-values are reported in parentheses. The asterisks * and ** denote significant
at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. a) constant terms are allowed to diﬀer between
the equations of the four trust categories. b) G2SLS random-eﬀects instrumental variable
regression (Balestra and Varadharajan-Krishnakumar, 1987).
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surement instruments), suppliers of metal products (e.g. aluminum) or en-
gineering firms doing R&D on cabin systems. Firms were asked to report
their oﬃcial industry code and/or their most important product or group of
products. This information was used for the repartition of firms in 8 sectors.
Approximately 14% of the firms are aircraft and spacecraft manufacturers;
14% manufacturers of electrical parts and other technical products; 17%
manufacturers of basic and fabricated metal products; 13% manufacturers of
chemicals, rubber, and plastic products; and 11% manufacturers of machin-
ery and equipment. Moreover, 11% of the firms are wholesalers or retailers,
and 17 % are service providers (e.g. software companies, engineering firms
and transport services). Industry dummy variables are included in the ran-
dom eﬀects estimation in order to control for industry-specific eﬀects. The
results reported in Column (3) of Table 5 suggest that the values of the es-
timated coeﬃcients are not substantially aﬀected. Moreover, the industry
eﬀects are jointly insignificant.19
The first hypothesis in section 2 postulates a positive relationship be-
tween trust and the inflow of knowledge; incoming knowledge may positively
aﬀect inter-firm trust, and trust in the relationship may aﬀect the inflow
of knowledge. If such feedback loops existed, this would imply endogeneity
of the incoming knowledge variable. The panel regression presented above,
however, is based on the implicit assumption that the variable ‘incoming
knowledge spillovers’ is exogenous with respect to trust in customers (sup-
pliers). Thus, I cannot rule out the possibility that estimation results are
biased. To take potential endogeneity of this variable into account, I have
employed a two-stage least-squares random-eﬀects estimator, where the mea-
sure of incoming knowledge spillovers is regressed on a number of instruments
19A Wald test shows that the industry eﬀects are not statistically significant at a 5%
significance level: χ2(7) = 11.43. Although not reported here, interacting the customer
dummy with the industry dummies (allowing for industry-specific customer dummies) also
leads to statistically insignificant eﬀects.
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variables in the first stage.20 The results are reported in Columns (4) and
(5) of Table 5. The estimated coeﬃcient of the incoming knowledge variable
is now higher and statistically significant. Only after inclusion of industry-
specific eﬀects does the significance level decrease, but the industry eﬀects
are not statistically significant.21
Furthermore, I have investigated potential diﬀerences between trust in
customers and trust in suppliers by performing separate estimations. The
results are reported in Tables 6 and 7. The estimated coeﬃcient of the
incoming spillover variable is still positive and statistically significant in the
fixed eﬀects and the random eﬀects regressions. Note that now the ‘within’
variation reflects the changes between proximate and distant firms. Thus,
results imply that the variation in the relevance of proximate and distant
customers (suppliers) as knowledge sources explains variation in firms’ trust
in proximate and distant customers (suppliers). Again, results suggest that
geographical proximity has a positive impact on trust in customer and trust
in suppliers.
There is some evidence, however, that results diﬀer with respect to the
impact of appropriability conditions. The sign of the coeﬃcient of the imper-
fect appropriability variable is still negative in all regressions, but it is only
statistically significant in the customer regressions (random eﬀects and be-
tween estimation) while statistically insignificant in all supplier regressions.
In particular, the results of the between regressions diﬀer remarkably. The
20The instrument variables are all variables except the knowledge variable. Moreover,
for each knowledge source category, the other knowledge source categories have been used
as instruments: for instance, the knowledge inflow from distant customers, near suppli-
ers and distant suppliers are instruments for the knowledge inflow from near customers.
Furthermore, the squared values of the variables as well as industry-specific dummies and
firm size dummies are used as instruments. The estimation results of the first stage are
available from the author upon request.
21A Wald test shows that the industry eﬀects are not statistically significant at a 5%
significance level: χ2(7) = 11.05.
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estimated coeﬃcient of the spillover variable is -0.198 and statistically signif-
icant at the 1 % level in the customer regression whereas its absolute value
is lower (-0.08) and statistically insignificant in the supplier regression.
4.4 Discussion
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that incoming knowledge
spillovers from customers positively aﬀect supplier trust. This confirms the
finding reported by Sako and Helper (1998) and Sako (1998) who found that
information flows from customers to suppliers have a positive impact on sup-
plier trust. This is remarkable, as these studies exclusively dealt with trust
of automotive suppliers in their customers whereas the sample used in this
study comprises firms from diﬀerent industrial sectors.
In contrast to the existing literature (e.g. Sako and Helper 2000, Dyer
and Chu 2003), this study not only focuses on suppliers’ trust in customers,
but the surveyed firms have also rated the degree of trust in their suppliers.
Results also indicate a positive and statistically significant impact of incom-
ing knowledge spillovers from suppliers on trust in suppliers. Thus, the level
of trust in vertically related firms tends to be higher when trading partners
have been important sources of external knowledge in the past irrespective of
whether partners are suppliers or customers. Since firms assess the relevance
of customers as knowledge sources significantly higher than the relevance of
suppliers, this can explain to some extent why trust in customers is signif-
icantly higher than trust in suppliers. However, the estimation results also
indicate that there is still a positive and statistically significant diﬀerence
between trust in customers and trust in suppliers that cannot be explained
by incoming knowledge spillovers.
Estimation results suggest that firms’ appropriability problems have a
negative impact on inter-firm trust. At first glance, this finding may seem
to be similar to the results of Sako and Helper (1998) and Sako (2000), who
found that suppliers’ trust in customers decreases if suppliers provide infor-
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ptTable 6: Determinants of Trust in Customers (balanced panel)
Fixed Random Between
(Incoming) spillovers
0.142∗∗
(2.71)
0.087∗
(2.23)
0.023
(0.40)
Imperf. appropriability
−0.020
(−0.31)
−0.103∗
(−2.12)
−0.198∗∗
(−2.71)
Labor source
0.127∗
(1.73)
0.090
(1.57)
−0.003
(−0.04)
Head-hunting
−0.070
(−1.37)
−0.019
(−0.43)
0.069
(0.79)
Proximity dummy
0.271∗∗
(2.64)
0.239∗∗
(2.47)
–
Constant –
4.161∗∗
(22.04)
4.676∗∗
(15.49)
R2 0.85 0.04 0.06
Standard Error 0.6547 1.1681 1.0590
F-test: OLS vs. FE 5.20∗∗∗ – –
Hausman-test – 8.83 –
Observations 266 266 133
Notes: The t-values are reported in parentheses. The asterisks * and ** denote significant
at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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ptTable 7: Determinants of Trust in Suppliers (balanced panel)
Fixed Random Between
(Incoming) spillovers
0.188∗∗
(3.10)
0.131∗∗
(3.30)
0.099
(1.84)
Imperf. appropriability
−0.064
(−0.84)
−0.078
(−1.50)
−0.080
(−1.13)
Labor source
0.058
(0.66)
−0.004
(−0.07)
−0.063
(−0.72)
Head-hunting
0.007
(0.12)
0.002
(0.15)
−0.032
(−0.39)
Proximity dummy
0.307∗
(2.61)
0.318∗∗
(2.88)
–
Constant –
3.712∗∗
(18.87)
4.170∗∗
(14.67)
R2 0.79 0.04 0.03
Standard Error 0.7675 1.1637 1.0313
F-test: OLS vs. FE 3.54∗∗ – –
Hausman-test – χ2(4) = 3.42 –
Observations 266 266 133
Notes: The t-values are reported in parentheses. The asterisks * and ** denote significant
at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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mation to customers without reciprocation. There is, however, an important
diﬀerence between this study and the above mentioned studies. In this study,
a measure is used that reflects involuntary information sharing, since firms
evaluate the danger of leakage of technical knowledge to other firms in gen-
eral. In contrast, the measure used by Sako and Helper (1998) and Sako
(2000) reflects the diﬀerence between the voluntary provision of information
by customers and the voluntary provision of information by suppliers. Hence,
the measure used in this study captures a firm’s appropriability problems in
general while their measure reflects asymmetries in the exchange of informa-
tion (a lack of reciprocity). The negative impact of appropriability problems
on a firm’s trust in customers (suppliers) found in this study is likely to re-
flect a decrease in ‘trust as prudence’ due to appropriability problems, but
it cannot be ruled out that ‘trust as hope’ also decreases.
Furthermore, the estimation results provide empirical evidence support-
ing the hypothesis that geographical proximity between business partners has
a positive eﬀect on inter-firm trust. The statistically significant coeﬃcient of
geographical proximity dummy is remarkable because the measure of trust
used in this study might be biased against this result. The trust questions
asked focus on the ‘most important business partners’. However, firms may
trust their most important trading partners irrespective where the partner is
located because they have many and repeated transactions. This may lead
to an underestimation of the eﬀect of geographical distance, therefore fur-
ther emphasizing the relevance of geographical proximity for the emergence
of trust.
These results may have implications for firms’ cooperative behavior. If
trust were viewed as a tendency to cooperate, the negative impact of ap-
propriability problems would imply that firms that exhibit a low level of
trust in business partners due to appropriability problems may have a lower
propensity to cooperate. This interpretation is supported by the results of re-
cent empirical studies on R&D cooperation between customers and suppliers.
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Bönte and Keilbach (2005) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) report that
the probability of cooperating for innovation is indeed negatively aﬀected by
imperfect appropriability. Furthermore, a higher level of trust between ge-
ographically proximate partners may facilitate establishing and maintaining
cooperative relationships between these partners.
Several empirical studies have found a positive impact of trust on eco-
nomic success. This may be explained by its relevance for cooperative rela-
tionships that may avoid ineﬃciencies due to noncooperative behavior (Gam-
betta 1988, Zak and Knack 2001). As pointed out in Section 2, inter-firm
trust may be ‘trust as prudence’ or ‘trust as hope’. The former pertains to
cooperations in an ideal (economic) world with perfect information where
complete contracts can fully specify the action of each agent in every con-
tingency. ‘Trust as hope’ may therefore help to overcome non-cooperative
behavior in environments characterized informational incompleteness. Sako
(1998, p. 26) states that “Trust is important and useful, particularly in
facilitating cooperation in uncertain environments and unforeseen circum-
stances”.22
One shortcoming of the empirical analysis is surely the lack of an indicator
for the degree of contractural completeness. If contracts between customers
and suppliers are suﬃciently complete (i.e. contracts specify each party’s
duties, and contracts can be enforced), there are no vulnerabilities to be
exploited. The direct consequence of complete contracts would be a very
high level of trust in customers (suppliers) reported by sample firms. The
degree of contractural completeness may depend on the type of contract, on
firm characteristics, and on industry characteristics. In the present study,
it is not possible to control for the completeness of certain contracts since
trust questions in the questionnaire are not related to specific contractural
22It is fair to say that cooperations that are facilitated by trust can also be total wel-
fare reducing; for example trust may facilitate collusion between firms at the expense of
consumers.
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agreements. Instead, the sample firms assessed the general level of trust
in their most important customers (suppliers). However, to the extent to
which contractural completeness is firm-specific and/or industry-specific, it
has been controlled for by taking into account firm and industry-specific
eﬀects in the econometric specification. The results presented above suggest
that taking into account such eﬀects hardly aﬀects the estimation results.
In additon, empirical results suggest that trust in customers is higher on
average than trust in suppliers. Can this result be explained by the percep-
tion that the level of ‘trust as prudence’ in customers is higher? One could
argue, for instance, that firms may know that contracts discipline ‘untrust-
worthy’ behavior of customers more eﬀectively than ‘untrustworthy’ behavior
of suppliers. In this case, a higher degree of contractual completeness would
imply a higher level of ‘trust as prudence’ in customers. Moreover, one could
argue that the level of ‘trust as prudence’ is positively related to relationship-
specific investments. A firm may only be willing to make such an investment
if the trading partner does not have any incentive to take advantage of the
vulnerabilities created by such an investment; for example the partner will
not hold up the firm after investment is made. If relationship-specific in-
vestments have to be made by suppliers rather than by customers, this may
explain a higher level of ‘trust as prudence’ in customers. Alternatively, the
significant diﬀerence might be explained by diﬀerences in ‘trust as hope’.
Firms might “hope”, for instance, that they stay in good relations with their
most important customer so that the latter does not switch to other sup-
pliers and this may lead to observed higher measures of trust. The results
presented by MacKinnon et al. point to this direction. Based on interview
data of small and medium sized firms in the Aberdeen Oil complex, MacK-
innon et al. (p. 100) report that ”trust was seen as particularly important in
terms of the need to remain flexible and responsive to customers’ enquiries
and demands” and that ”the expectations of both customers and suppliers
are crucially supported and sustained through social relationships between
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key individuals”.
5 Conclusion
This study examines the impact of knowledge spillovers and geographical
proximity on inter-firm trust in buyer-supplier relations. Empirical findings
suggest that incoming spillovers, imperfect appropriability, and geographic
proximity have an impact on firm’ trust in customer and suppliers. In par-
ticular, this study provides the following three findings:
First, the results of the empirical analysis suggest that incoming knowl-
edge spillovers from customers (suppliers) are positively related to firms’
trust in customers (suppliers). The level of trust in vertically related firms
is higher when trading partners have been an important source of knowledge
in the past. Second, results provide empirical evidence for the relevance of
appropriability conditions for inter-firm trust between customers and suppli-
ers. The greater the danger of leakage of technical knowledge to other firms,
the lower is the suppliers (customers) level of trust in customers (suppliers).
This result implies that the emergence of trust is hampered when firms are
not able to protect their proprietary innovations. Third, the estimation re-
sults support the notion that geographical proximity has a positive impact
on inter-firm trust. Inter-firm trust between geographically close business
partners is significantly higher than inter-firm trust between distant firms.
Moreover, results suggest that inter-trust in customers exceeds inter-trust in
suppliers even if one controls for the eﬀects of the above mentioned determi-
nants.
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A Data source
The data used in this study are drawn from a survey of German aeronautical
firms conducted in June 2001.23 A sample of 514 aeronautical firms from
Germany has been surveyed. These firms have in common an aeronautical
aﬃnity due to the fact that they are linked to aeronautic firms in networks,
such as input-output networks, knowledge networks, labor networks, and so
on. They are either oﬃcially assigned to the aeronautical sector themselves,
suppliers of technologically critical inputs to aeronautic firms, members of
aeronautic business associations or R&D cooperation partners to aeronau-
tic firms. The sample has been drawn from the following data-bases: Air-
bus Deutschland GmbH, Hamburg (list of suppliers‘ of technologically crit-
ical “flying material”), Airbus Deutschland GmbH, Hamburg (list of R&D
cooperation partners), Hanse Aerospace e.V., Hamburg (list of the North-
ern German aeronautics business association members), Bundesverband der
Deutschen Luft- und Raumfahrtindustrie e.V., Berlin (list of the German
aeronautics business association members), chambers of commerce (list of
aeronautical firms). The firms have been contacted by telephone and email
in order to arrange a telephone interview with its general managers. Inter-
views were conducted in June 2001 on the basis of a detailed questionnaire.
The final questionnaire was dev loped following two types of pilot studies.
Pre-tests were run both face-to-face as well as by telephone. In total 179
firms have been willing to give an interview, which corresponds to a response
rate of 34.8%.
23The survey has been originally designed to collect data on agglomeration forces. See
Pfähler and Lublinski (2003) for further details.
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B Estimation Results
In order to check whether the linear specification is a reasonable approxima-
tion the relationship between trust and the explanatory variables has been
estimated by using a simple OLS estimator as well as by using an ordered
probit model that is appropriate for ordered data (Greene 2003, pp. 736).
As can be seen from Tables 8 and 9 similar results with respect to sign and
significance levels of the estimated coeﬃcients are obtained. Thus, the linear
specification is a reasonable approximation.24
The equations (1a - 1d) have been estimated separately (see Table 9) and
tests for poolability of the data have been performed. The results suggest
that no diﬀerence between proximate and distant customers (suppliers) exist
while the null hypothesis of poolability of customer and supplier data is
rejected (see Table 10).
24Note, that the estimated coeﬃcients of the OLS regression represent the marginal
eﬀects of the respective variables although this interpretation is not strictly correct for the
estimated coeﬃcients of the ordered probit model. However, the sign of a coeﬃcient has a
clear interpretation for the extreme cases ‘very low degree of trust’ and ‘very high degree
of trust’. A negative (positive) coeﬃcient implies, for instance, that the increase in the
respective variable leads to a decrease (increase) in a firm’s probability of having a high
degree of trust. See Greene (p. 738).
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Table 8: Ordered Probit Estimation of the Determinants of Trust
Customer
(proximity)
Customer
(distance)
Supplier
(proximity)
Supplier
(distance)
(Incoming) spillovers
0.028
(0.62)
0.046
(1.05)
0.116∗
(2.49)
0.038
(0.89)
Imperf. appropriability
−0.132∗
(−2.33)
−0.123∗
(−2.07)
−0.032
(−0.56)
−0.123∗
(−2.13)
Labor source
−0.005
(−0.09)
0.006
(0.07)
−0.054
(−0.83)
−0.08
(−0.09)
Head-hunting
0.063
(1.09)
0.079
(1.23)
−0.039
(−0.64)
0.044
(0.70)
Constant
2.09∗∗
(6.87)
1.88∗∗
(6.34)
1.939∗∗
(6.72)
2.22∗∗
(7.07)
Scaled R2 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03
Log-Likelihood -235.33 -255.68 -256.94 247.44
LR-test (zero slopes) 5.61 5.64 7.36 4.72
Observations 167 164 150 156
Notes: The t-values are reported in parentheses. The asterisks * and ** denote significant
at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 9: Trust category-specific OLS regressions: Determinants of Trust for
Customer and Suppliers
Customer
(proximity)
Customer
(distance)
Supplier
(proximity)
Supplier
(distance)
(Incoming) spillovers
0.043
(0.89)
0.057
(1.09)
0.141∗
(2.61)
0.051
(0.99)
Imperf. appropriability
−0.140∗
(−2.36)
−0.141∗
(−1.99)
−0.030
(−0.43)
−0.151∗
(−2.09)
Labor source
−0.002
(−0.03)
0.013
(0.13)
−0.060
(−0.78)
−0.08
(−0.08)
Head-hunting
0.054
(0.89)
0.071
(0.94)
−0.046
(−0.66)
0.041
(0.56)
Constant
4.65∗∗
(19.13)
4.36∗∗
(15.59)
4.092∗∗
(15.23)
4.16∗∗
(15.07)
R2 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03
Standard Error 1.1263 1.2544 1.2188 1.2522
Observations 167 164 150 156
Notes: The t-values are reported in parentheses. The asterisks * and ** denote significant
at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
Table 10: Results of Chow tests for Poolability of the Data
Null Hypothesis Test Statistic
Coeﬃcients of proximate and distant customers are equal F (2, 326) = 0.789
Coeﬃcients of proximate and distant suppliers are equal F (2, 301) = 2.538
Coeﬃcients of customers and suppliers are equal F (2, 632) = 8.77∗∗
Notes: The t-values are reported in parentheses. The asterisks * and ** denote
significant at the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
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Customer
Trust No Trust
Supplier Trust a,a -d,a+c
No Trust a+c,-d 0,0
Fig. 1. Trust Game
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